The tobacco industry's thwarting of marketing restrictions and health warnings in Lebanon. by Nakkash, R & Lee, K
Nakkash, R; Lee, K (2009) The tobacco industry’s thwarting of mar-
keting restrictions and health warnings in Lebanon. Tobacco control,
18 (4). pp. 310-316. ISSN 0964-4563 DOI: 10.1136/tc.2008.029405
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4995/
DOI: 10.1136/tc.2008.029405
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
The tobacco industry’s thwarting of marketing
restrictions and health warnings in Lebanon
R Nakkash,1 K Lee2
1 Department of Health
Behaviour and Education, Center
for Research on Population and
Health, American University
Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon; 2 Centre
on Global Change and Health,
London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, Keppel
Street, London WC1E 7HT UK
Correspondence to:
R Nakkash, Department of
Health Behaviour and Education,
Center for Research on
Population and Health, American
University Beirut, Beirut,
Lebanon; rima.nakkash@aub.
edu.lb
Received 24 December 2008
Accepted 26 May 2009
This paper is freely available
online under the BMJ Journals
unlocked scheme, see http://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/info/
unlocked.dtl
ABSTRACT
Aims: This article outlines how the tobacco industry has
undermined tobacco control efforts in Lebanon since the
early 1970s.
Methods: An analysis of online and on-site tobacco
industry documents, reviews of newspapers, policy and
other documents, and interviews with key policy makers
were conducted.
Results: Findings reveal how the weakness of tobacco
control legislation in Lebanon has been the product of an
effective tobacco industry strategy to weaken the content
and scope of regulation, and delay adoption and
implementation.
Conclusions: The tobacco industry has built and
maintained strong alliances that were and are regularly
mobilised to effectively oppose regulation. Despite
ratification of the World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control in 2005, Lebanon’s
tobacco control track remains weak. Public health
professionals and the government should work hard to
oppose such tobacco industry tactics.
Adult cigarette smoking prevalence in Lebanon
remains relatively high at 29% for males and 6.9%
for females, the highest in the Middle East after
Jordan.1 Cancer morbidity and mortality trends
reflect a smoking epidemic in its mature stages.2 3
Overall, tobacco is the leading cause of preventable
deaths (3500 deaths annually),4 predicted to kill
more people over the next 30 years than the 16-
year civil war.5
Despite this health burden, tobacco control in
Lebanon remains relatively weak.1 Saudi Arabia,
Oman, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Qatar, Iran,
Libya, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria
and Jordan have all adopted advertising restric-
tions. All have full or partial public smoking bans,
although enforcement is variable. Almost half have
increased taxes as a policy measure.6 In contrast,
Lebanon has no national tobacco control policy, no
restrictions on direct advertising, promotion or
sponsorship and no law on smoke-free environ-
ments.1
The policy influence of the tobacco industry in
the Middle East has been previously analysed
largely based on Philip Morris (PM) documents.
Focusing on the Middle East Working Group
(MEWG) and Middle East Tobacco Association
(META), the reports describe the undermining of
smoking restrictions, cigarette testing procedures
and taxation in the Gulf countries and Saudi
Arabia.7 8
This paper analyses how the tobacco industry
has undermined tobacco control in Lebanon from
the 1970s to early 2000s. By analysing documents
of British American Tobacco (BAT), PM and RJ
Reynolds (RJR), supported by key informant
interviews, industry efforts to weaken marketing
restrictions and health warnings are described. The
authors have previously argued that transnational
tobacco companies (TTCs) have pursued market
access to Lebanon9 because of its significance as a
regional ‘‘trendsetter’’.10 For similar reasons, the
industry has sought to delay or weaken marketing
restrictions and warning labels. These findings
suggest the need for greater transparency in the
role of the tobacco industry in public policy
making, as part of the government’s commitments
under the World health Organization (WHO)
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC).
METHODS
A total of 65 files related to the Middle East were
reviewed at the BAT Guildford Depository in 2004.
From 2005–2008, document searches were under-
taken of the BAT Document Archive (BATDA)11 12
and Legacy Tobacco Document Library. Keywords
used related to industry personnel, organisations,
policy makers, government officials and specialist
industry terms. Alternative spellings and Boolean
searches were used to combine keywords. A total
of 2340 documents were reviewed which enabled
the construction of a historical and thematic
narrative. Further analysis incorporated validation
techniques within a hermeneutic approach13
including corroboration of interpretation between
authors.
Official documents of the state-owned mono-
poly, the Regie (Regie Libanaise des Tabacs et
Tombacs) and Ministry of Public Health are not
publicly accessible. Thus, 20 semistructured inter-
views were conducted in Lebanon in 2006 with key
informants including public officials, industry
representatives and public health advocates.
Interviews, recorded and transcribed in Arabic
and then translated into English, supported the
interpretation of industry documents by contex-
tualising and confirming their content. Transcripts
were coded by keyword to facilitate their use
alongside documents. Secondary sources, including
local media reports, scholarly works and industry
sources, were used as supplementary data sources.
RESULTS
Marketing and advertising restrictions ‘‘will be
shelved’’
Efforts to restrict tobacco marketing and advertis-
ing in Lebanon began in 1970 when Minister of
Public Health (MOPH) Moutran Habib introduced
draft legislation on cinemas and television.14 The
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industry’s ally in opposing the bill was the advertising sector.
Advertising executive Muhamed Shukayr (General Manager,
Societe Orientale de Publicite) reassured William Dales (PM
Overseas Office, Greece) that ‘‘many factors…will prevent
execution of the Minister’s order’’ including a predicted adverse
effect on ‘‘the plantation of tobacco, production of cigarettes
and trade’’.14 Also supporting the industry, according to former
director of the Regie Walid Salam were local agents and
distributors with interests in other sectors:
These distributors are not only distributors of tobacco, like
Marlboro…Kettaneh [Freres, PM’s local distributor] has a million
other things, like construction, electricity, etc. They don’t
pressure specifically for tobacco but they can bother the
government in other things so the government is forced to listen
to them in the end. (Interview; Beirut, 22 May 2006)
Lobbying with Kettaneh Freres, Shukayr correctly predicted
‘‘the matter will be shelved’’.14 A second bill introduced in 1973,
to ban advertising of foreign cigarettes15 met a similar fate.
With the outbreak of civil war in 1975, there were no further
developments until the Lebanese Cancer Society’s anti-tobacco
campaign in 1978.16 PM reported ‘‘periodic coverage in the
Lebanese press, which is liberal in character and holds a
predominant position in the pan-Arab region’’.16 Anti-smoking
sentiment, endorsed by the Arab League17 18 was thought to
mainly exist among ‘‘the highly educated and the medical
profession…influenced by…Western Europe and in America’’.16
Seeking ‘‘to maintain the ability to advertise our products in a
convincing and cost effective manner’’,17 PM again found an ally
in the advertising industry. In April 1980, Shukayr argued to
MOPH Talal Miri’bi and Prime Minister Salim El Hoss that
‘‘prompt execution of the decree—as far as the advertising
requirements are concerned—would give way to transfer of pan
Arab advertising budgets to other countries’’.19 According to
Shukayr, both ‘‘promised [to] take the necessary step to defer
the decree’s execution till it is properly restipulated’’.19
Advertising agencies followed up with ‘‘a memo to the minister,
a copy to the Regie, detailing this difficulties [sic] of applying it
immediately and asking for a normal delay’’.19 In May 1980,
Macleod reported to Walter Thoma (PM International) that:
...the decree has been suspended and a joint committee composed
of members of the Regie and the Ministry of Health to be formed
to study the proposals. Mr Mohamed Shukayr, who is both PM
advertising agent and President of the Lebanese Advertising
Association, intends to request the participation of the
Association in the joint committee.18
Limited progress over the next decade suggests industry’s
opposition was effective. There was little further discussion of
marketing restrictions until 1994 when MOPH Marwan Hmade
revived the issue, insisting that health would be placed over
profits.20 Later reflecting on his efforts, Hmade cited the
advertising industry as his key opponent: ‘‘In Parliament,
whenever we attempted to go further on banning tobacco
advertising…we always clashed with the lobbyists. I would not
say the tobacco lobby but the tobacco advertising lobby’’
(interview; Beirut, 31 May 2006). Pressure by advertising
agencies, according to former National Tobacco Control
Programme (NTCP) manager Youssef Bassim, led to a television
presenter being threatened with his job if the MOPH was asked
about tobacco issues.21 More subtly, Nadine Keirooz (Director,
Tobacco Free Initiative Lebanon) describes how the media
was unreceptive to giving tobacco control issues ‘‘visibility’’
(interview; Beirut, 29 June 2006). Mroeh, (former MOPH)
believes the global scale of media interests created political
influence:
The TV and all the media, not only newspapers, but the most
important are the advertising companies… which get money
from the tobacco companies.…The tobacco companies, of course,
feed into huge international companies that give locally but have
huge businesses in London, New York. (Interview; Beirut, 11
May 2006)
Voluntary codes: ‘‘[P]ut the matter to bed…for many years to
come’’
Alongside lobbying, the industry supported a voluntary code in
Lebanon to delay or prevent binding regulation.22–25 Following a
meeting in 2000 of Michael Erickson (US Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention), Lawrence Green (Director for Smoking
or Health) and MOPH Karam Karam to discuss a proposed
advertising ban, Najjar and Maher Achi (Chief Operating
Officer, Leo Burnett) planned ‘‘informal’’ approaches to the
MOPH on a social occasion to suggest youth smoking
prevention programmes. The strategy was:
...to consider internally and jointly with the rest of the industry,
those marketing practices that we may be willing to concede,
preferably voluntarily (and eventually revise the industry’s
voluntary marketing code to reflect such concessions).
Alternatively, such concessions may become necessary under
threat of legislative amendment, and we should be prepared with
our list of reasonable concessions….
[this is] an opportunity to…constructively engage the Ministry
on youth smoking prevention, to mobilise allies and hopefully
put the matter to bed in a manner satisfactory to all parties for
many years to come.22
Previously, in August 1995 Charles Hay (META Dubai) wrote
to members on a meeting:
[t]o devise and agree an internal ‘voluntary code of marketing
practice’ that clarifies all marketing freedoms not already
proscribed and that can be used as a demonstration of
responsibility with Government in the event of further proposed
legislation….10
A draft Voluntary Marketing Code for Lebanon was
circulated in October 1995 (and approved in 1996)26–29 with
the preamble:
(a) that cigarettes are a legally traded product;
(b) that smoking is an adult activity and that any advertising’ or
promotional activity undertaken by the industry will only be
designed for and marketed to adult smokers that are defined as
smokers of 18 years or older;
(c) that adults who choose to smoke are entitled to information
on existing and new brands and styles of cigarettes;
(d) that advertising is an important means of communication
with consumers and is necessary to maintain fair competition
between brands and that advertising is an essential component of
a free market economy…
Print: no branded cigarette advertising shall be specifically
directed at minors. No branded cigarette advertising shall appear
in print media which is directed principally toward minors.27
According to George Saade (former director of the National
Tobacco Control Program), however, advertisers were reluctant
to accept even voluntary restrictions: ‘‘The media companies are
blackmailing these big multinationals in Lebanon telling them,
‘‘Listen you are losing market share here if you don’t do ads
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because other companies are doing advertising and market share
is going up’’. Saade describes how TTCs approached him for
support:
BAT and PM… told me that they want to stop the advertising of
tobacco products but they need backup from the MOPH and
Lebanese government. They said, ‘We will back up the Lebanese
government to ban ads on tobacco products but we know that
media companies are against us on this proposal’. (Interview;
Beirut, 15 March 2006)
According to Ramsay Najjar (former President of the
Advertising Association), protecting market share was the real
motive of TTCs:
If they close advertising now, the newcomers cannot advertise
and thus take their market share. So they stopped the game at a
time when they had the highest market share in the market.
That’s why the first who started this idea and started convincing
others to stop advertising also – what they called ‘responsible
marketing’, the buzz word of corporate multinationals…the first
who demanded it was PM, whom are market leaders worldwide.
(Interview; Beirut, 15 June 2006)
Chair of the Parliamentary Committee for Public Health,
Labour, and Social Affairs (PHC) Atef Majdalani agrees:
...big companies…don’t care about advertising since they are
already known and don’t care about it. Not because they are
Caritas [a Lebanese social welfare foundation], but because there
are new companies entering the market. If advertising stops, it
hurts the new companies coming into the market since every-
body already knows existing brands. (Interview; Beirut, 3 March
2006)
Given the dominance of PM and BAT, legislation to ban
‘‘above the line’’ (direct) advertising would be like ‘‘coming to
put out the fire, when all has turned to ashes’’ (interview;
Beirut, 15 June 2006). As shown elsewhere,30 31 PM and BAT
then shifted to ‘‘below the line’’ (indirect) activities not subject
to the voluntary code, such as sponsorship and brand stretching.
The strategic success of the voluntary code to prevent binding
regulation appears affirmed by the failure of draft legislation in
October 1998 to progress beyond the Council of Ministers.32
To ‘‘temporarily freeze the implementation of’’ health warnings
Health warnings have been the subject of the only two pieces of
tobacco control legislation in Lebanon to date. Documents
suggest that, as well as limiting their scope, the industry
effectively undermined their implementation.
The first two attempts to introduce health warnings came in
1976 and 1978, with both failing to progress beyond a draft bill.
No warning size was specified and the proposed wording was
relatively weak: ‘‘The Lebanese Ministry of Health warns you of
the hazards of smoking’’.33 A stronger message, ‘‘Smoking is the
main cause of lung cancer, cardiovascular disease and arterial
disease’’, was proposed in 1980,33 which would occupy 10% of
the packet area of domestic and imported brands. Kettaneh
Freres wrote to Macleod objecting that the decree was ‘‘without
consultation with interested parties’’, ‘‘strict and arbitrary’’ and
would have negative economic repercussions.34 35
While PM noted that several bills ‘‘have not been implemen-
ted due to the security situation’’,18 growing regional support for
tobacco control warranted attention. Towards this end, it
initiated lobbying which it ‘‘alone should direct’’ as ‘‘[d]iscus-
sion and coordination with the rest of the industry will only
confuse and delay action…we have all the necessary influence
and contacts’’.36 While taking the lead in seeking ‘‘modification
of abusive clauses’’.37 PM maintained a low profile to create the
impression that lobbying was by local interests:
The [lobbying] file should be compiled primarily to include
scientific information, which can be used against qualified
medical opinion from the Lebanese Ministry of Health. I am still
very much in favour of the idea of getting the relevant Regie
managers to attend a presentation and our agent in Lebanon will
keep the pressure on this proposal. However, in the absence of
this action, believe an anonymous (not PM) file of information to
be of value.37
Economic arguments were again invoked: ‘‘Lebanon is the
most important source of Pan Arab press coverage.
Unreasonable warnings on advertising might encourage adver-
tisers to reduce their advertising in Lebanese publications, in
favour of sources where less obnoxious warnings apply’’.18 In
June 1980 Kettaneh Freres updated Macleod on lobbying efforts:
The Regie…hopes to temporarily freeze the implementation of
this regulation and requests that, in the case of a new study, it be
involved in a committee of mixed membership that would define
the principles of the new regulation. It is certain that, at this
initial stage, the action taken by the Regie constitutes a positive
step; however, should the Minister of Public Health, under the
influence and with the help of the scientific circles of AUB
[American University of Beirut], go back and discuss the same
problem, the Regie would be left with no scientific basis with
which to defend itself in this issue [translated from French].34
Macleod, in turn, told Richard Corner (International
Advertising Association) that there was little cause for concern
since ‘‘none of the [previous] provisions were ever implemen-
ted’’.38
Implementation was delayed for several years further. One
reason was variation in warnings across the region.39 In Saudi
Arabia, for example, pan-Arab publications contained the
phrase, ‘‘Government warning: smoking harms your health
and we advise you to refrain from it’’.40 This was stronger than
the phrasing in Lebanon, but weaker than Saudi regulations.40
Documents suggest the industry used this confusion to push for
non-compliance. With the adoption of the 1983 law in Lebanon,
for example, the MEWG reported that ‘‘Advertisements in Pan
Arab Press printed outside the Lebanon, would not carry
Warnings’’.41
Another issue was timing. Martin Canon (BAT) wrote to
Kirkland Blair (Rothmans) in 1981 stating that ‘‘we have general
agreement not to ship new health warning stock to any markets
unless there has been a published decree’’.42 There was also
concerns health warnings could be ‘‘construed as an admission
of causation by the industry’’.43 BAT’s US subsidiary Brown and
Williamson (B&W) opposed referring to ‘‘specific diseases’’ or
attributing the warning to an official body such as govern-
ment.44 45 An added complication was the contraband trade
which supplied ‘‘[o]ver 50% of the cigarette sales in Lebanon’’
without warning labels.10
According to Richard Davies (Public Affairs, BAT), PM
supported health warnings to pre-empt stronger regulation
and ‘‘commercial advantage’’.46 As documented elsewhere,47 PM
‘‘would ‘negotiate’ the introduction of health warnings where
none currently exist on the basis that they might be able to
achieve ‘Mild’ versions’’.48 Patrick Sheehy (Chairman, BAT)
noted PM’s potential economic advantage: ‘‘It has been
rumored that PMI instigated the decision to require a health
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warning…Apparently, PMI will reduce the price of
MARLBORO once the health warning is implemented’’.48
Documents suggest that, even after taking effect, efforts to
undermine the law continued. A MEWG meeting reported that
‘‘Lebanon R.J.R. tabled a draft Decree and English transla-
tion…that after amendment it had been signed by the Prime
Minister and was effective from 16.10.83’’.49 Along with the
removal of tar and nicotine limits, the size of warnings was
further limited to 5% of the pack size. Because of warnings in
‘‘unreadable fine print’’ (Mroeh interview; Beirut, 11 May
2006), the Council of Ministers amended the decree in
December 1983 to 10% of pack size (FCTC provisions later
adopted recommend no less than 30% and optimally 50%). A
1984 MEWG meeting noted unsuccessful industry efforts to
overturn the law: ‘‘[w]hether the new Decree could be frozen
or not was out of our control’’.49 Attention instead focused
on maintaining weak phrasing, a tactic successfully used
elsewhere50 Moreover, warnings scuppered long-anticipated
restrictions on advertising:
They went to the President… [who] called me and told me this
rule will create problems with the newspapers and how we can’t
let them lose money and go bankrupt…So let’s adjust it a bit.
Therefore we reduced from a total ban on advertising to a
warning. (Mroeh interview; Beirut, 11 May 2006)
More effective implementation was not pursued further until
after the civil war.51 52 In 1992, the PHC began discussing
stronger warnings, such as ‘‘Smoking causes cancer, heart and
artery disease’’, which would be rotated, occupy 20% of pack
size and extend to broadcast media. The amendment would also
allow the MOPH to follow tobacco advertisements with a
counter advertisement.53 54 Documents suggest intense industry
lobbying again delayed and weakened the proposed revision:
‘‘[f]ollowing discussion with the tobacco companies and
advertising agencies, the government has made no moves to
introduce it. Industry/government talks on an ongoing informal
basis aim to slow down the possible introduction of further
legislation’’.55 The amendment, eventually adopted in 1995,
used the phrase, ‘‘The Ministry of Health Warns: Smoking
Leads to Serious and Fatal Diseases’’.56 Instead of a specific size,
the law required pack warnings to be visible to the naked eye,
15% of print advertisements and 15% of broadcast media. There
was no provision for rotating warnings.
On World No Tobacco Day in June 2000, MOPH Karam
announced his intention to ban tobacco advertisement.57 He
proposed to expand ‘‘the space used for health warnings on
cigarette packages to 60% of the surface area’’.58 While two bills
were proposed in 2003 and 2004, none have been adopted to
date.
The PHC: ‘‘putting up barriers and obstacles’’
The Lebanese government’s failure to adopt stronger tobacco
control since 2000 has been due in part to renewed political and
economic instability. The lack of a functioning government and
public administration, amid simmering conflict and sectarian
division, has crippled the legislative process.59 However, key
informant interviews suggest strong industry representation
within the PHC, the main public body where tobacco control
legislation has been debated, has been a key factor. In 2003 a
comprehensive tobacco advertising ban was submitted by MPs,
with the support of the Islamic Health Society, WHO, NTCP
and Lebanese Consumer Association. The bill was discussed
several times but rejected in August 2004. According to Saade,
the basis for rejection was the Regie’s claim, supported by the
MOF, of the likely economic impact to advertising (US $20
million annually) and employment. Instead, the Regie proposed
restrictions on sales to those under 18 years old by removing
billboards next to schools and sports clubs, not advertising in
cinemas before 21:00 and broadcast media before 22:00, and
banning samples.60 The ineffectiveness of industry proposals to
reduce youth smoking has been described elsewhere.61
WHO’s adoption of the FCTC in 2005 prompted efforts in
Lebanon to strengthen policy in line with the agreement. The
PHC invited stakeholders to discuss advertising restrictions,
health warnings, smoke-free places, sampling, and tar and
nicotine labelling. Since 2004, the bill has undergone numerous
reviews and discussion. It was also discussed by the Council of
Ministers but no decision has been taken to date.
According to Majdalani, policy debate has been open and fair:
‘‘There were many sides and viewpoints…All discussed it [the
bill] and gave their comments’’. On the Regie he states, ‘‘Of
course they tried to influence us and they gave their comments
on the proposed law. Some we agree to and others we don’t’’.
For example, the Regie’s opposed banning packs of less than 10
cigarettes but this was rejected given their affordability to
youth. On advertising, Majdalani believes economic interests
need protecting:
There is no way we can do that [ban advertising] since we will be
affecting the economic sector directly which…plays a major part
in the Lebanese economy….in another sense this law does not do
the job since fighting smoking is a bigger and wider social issue.
Najjar blamed tobacco control advocates for the lack of
progress: ‘‘Be it either WHO or NGO’s [non-governmental
organisations] or syndicate of doctors or any related to any
other issue related to tobacco control, they are extreme in their
thinking…and that is the reason why, in my opinion, the
subject is not being effectively dealt with’’. He advocated
gradual change:
I don’t want to call it extremism. I want to call it immaturity.
You cannot deal with a subject of this kind except gradually. I
know from my work, as a strategist, the strategist to reach his
objectives… builds a plan. He does not bump his head on the
wall and say either my way or nothing.
This was echoed by Salam: ‘‘We are not against this at all. We
are for regulation but it has to be done slowly and progressively’’.
According to Mirna Wakid, President of the Lebanese
Pulmonary Association, however, representation on the PHC
was skewed, with industry interests outweighing public health
advocates:
I was in total shock because… [Majdalani] got people together
who are essentially against the project proposal altogether. The
idea of having these people in the meeting! …I don’t understand
how he got people who have conflicting interests.…All the
people attending did not know what they were talking about. No
one read or examined their documents. And at the same time you
have the opposing camp, all opposing and not convinced with
anything in tobacco control….
Because in their argument they were negative the whole time,
they said this would not work, this we would not do…they had
the right to veto things which is not asked from them or
requested from them, since this is an experts meeting. Many
barriers were put up. (Interview; Beirut, 13 June 2006)
The role of vested interests is echoed by MP and PHC member
Ismail Sukkarieh: ‘‘The parliamentary members are made up of
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sects…you want someone to legislate… [and] even if they
legislate you want them to implement…they will not control and
implement against the interests of their own sects or leadership’’
(interview; Beirut, 17 April 2006). Former Prime Minister El Hoss
describes, ‘‘Possible opponents are the MPs from the region where
tobacco is grown. These members represent whole regions in the
South whose living is from the income they get from selling
tobacco’’ (interview; Beirut, 29 March 2006). Such livelihoods
have been seriously affected by instability since 2006, with some
fields affected by unexploded ordinance.62 For Zuhier Berro,
President of the Lebanese Consumer Association, ‘‘gradual’’
change has benefited industry tactics:
We agreed to a programme but we did not agree on the length of
the programme….what is happening is that year after year there
is delay…
Even though it is true that we did not see or face sharp
opposition to the law by companies, what is happening
practically and factually is that until now no law was issued even
though big sections of it have been proposed for many years…the
opposition is not direct but is happening indirectly under the
table. (Interview; Beirut, 20 March 2006)
This strategy has been particularly effective in a country
already hampered by chronically weak governance. As Mroeh
describes, ‘‘A weak political system will always do compromises
and be under the influence of the lobbyist’’.
DISCUSSION
The weakness of tobacco control in Lebanon has been due, in
large part, to effective industry tactics to weaken the content
and scope of regulation and delay its adoption and implementa-
tion. Lebanon has been important as a ‘‘major influence in the
Middle East…as trendsetters for consumer preferences’’.63
Industry success has been due to several factors. First, strong
alliances have been forged among TTCs, the Regie, associated
industries (ie, advertising, distributors, farmers) and senior
officials representing tobacco-dependent constituencies. These
alliances, supported by the MEWG and META, have opposed
bills at various stages of government discussion. Second,
industry advocates have deployed economic arguments to
oppose restrictions, backed by the vested interests of senior
policy makers. Third, the industry has advocated ineffective
voluntary codes to undermine binding regulations. Finally, the
industry has benefited from weak governance caused by
political and economic instability.
Ratification of the FCTC in December 2005 commits
Lebanon to comprehensive tobacco control measures. These
findings lead to several recommendations towards this goal.
First, while a poorly functioning government can contribute to
weak tobacco control, tobacco industry efforts to influence
policymaking is more significant. The recent strengthening of
environmental regulations in Lebanon through an active
ministry and local NGOs,64 65 suggests new policy initiatives
can still be undertaken. Effective governance is an important,
but not essential, factor in more effective health policy.66 67 The
public health community should work to publicly reveal
industry strategies and counter its arguments. For example,
the public health community should challenge longstanding
economic rationales using evidence from the World Bank and
other sources on taxation, privatisation, trade and foreign
investment.
Second, industry-focused research should be supported to
raise public awareness of its efforts to undermine legislation.
Industry-initiated voluntary codes and corporate social respon-
sibility programmes should be exposed. Increased public
awareness of tobacco industry tactics in Lebanon should be
part of the country’s ongoing struggle to strengthen governance.
Third, the undue influence of industry interests over tobacco
control policies in Lebanon should be addressed through Article
5.3 of the FCTC which states that ‘‘Parties shall act to protect
these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the
tobacco industry in accordance with national law’’.68 In
fulfilling this obligation, the Lebanese government should draw
on available guiding principles and guidelines for separating
tobacco control policy from vested interests, such as rejecting
voluntary codes, ensuring declarations of conflicts of interest,
restricting industry groups from public bodies and transparent
reporting of proceedings.
Fourth, the country currently lacks institutional capacity to
take forward obligations. The public health community should
act strategically, invigorating the NTCP with dedicated staff
and resources. Coordination among the few organisations active
in tobacco control, such as the Consumer Association,
universities and medical associations, is essential. Regional and
global links with like-minded organisations should be sought to
draw on expertise available in other countries. Importantly,
work must extend beyond the technical, to include engagement
in political processes such as lobbying, advocacy and campaign-
ing. Engagement with relevant ministries such as finance,
economy, education, information, interior and social affairs is
vital. Training in such methods should be provided through the
WHO Tobacco Free Initiative and Framework Convention
Alliance.
Finally, these efforts should be supported by the international
community. Implementation of the FCTC, in particular, would
benefit from effective reporting requirements by WHO, backed
by appropriate public censure, that ensure member states fulfil
their obligations. As Lebanese economist Marwan Iskandar
describes, ‘‘unless the FCTC matters to the political interests of
policy makers, they don’t give it attention. They sign up for a
good image internationally and leave it to surveillance that
takes place. International organisations rarely take the initiative
to verify’’ (interview; Beirut, 14 April 2006). Sustained support
What this paper adds
c Tobacco control in Lebanon remains weak despite ratification
of the World Health organization (WHO) Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control in 2005. There are no
restrictions on direct advertising, promotion or sponsorship; no
regulation of smoke-free environments; and one law requiring
a very small and weak health warning label.
c To date there has been limited scholarly analysis of tobacco
industry documents pertaining to Lebanon and the Middle
East. This paper, supported by key informant interviews,
provides the first detailed account of how the tobacco industry
has exerted policy influence in Lebanon. Its findings provide
important evidence to public health professionals,
governments and advocates in their efforts to effectively
regulate the tobacco industry.
c Increased public awareness of industry tactics in Lebanon is
urgently needed as part of the country’s struggle to protect
and promote public health, and to strengthen governance as a
whole.
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for implementation by WHO, perhaps drawing comparative
attention to regional performances, would help encourage
policy makers to make tobacco control matter more in Lebanon.
Competing interests: None.
Ethics approval: The protocol was reviewed and approved by the institutional review
boards at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the American
University of Beirut.
REFERENCES
1. World Health Organization. WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic: the
MPOWER package. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2008.
2. Shamseddine A, Sibai A-M, Gehchan N, et al. Cancer incidence in postwar
Lebanon: findings from the first national population-based registry. Ann Epidemiol
1998;14:663–8.
3. World Health Organization, Ministry of Public Health, & National
Noncommunicable disease programme. Cancer in Lebanon: National Cancer
Registry. Beirut, Lebanon: World Health Organization, 2003.
4. Daily Star. Draft law may reduce cigarette consumption. http://www.tobacco.org/
news/168595.html (accessed 4 April 2008).
5. Global Security. It is estimated that around 100 000 people died during the 16-year
civil war (1975–1991). http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.
html (accessed 2 October 2008).
6. World Bank. Tobacco: health impacts and economics in the Middle East and North
Africa region. Washington, DC: Human Development, Middle East and North Africa
Region, 2002.
7. World Health Organization. Voice of truth-volume 2 multinational tobacco industry
activity in the Middle East: a review of internal documents. Cairo, Egypt: World Health
Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 2001.
8. World Health Organization. Voice of truth-volume 1 multinational tobacco industry
activity in the Middle East: a review of internal documents. Cairo, Egypt: World Health
Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 2000.
9. Nakkash R, Lee K. Smuggling as the ‘‘key to a combined market’’: BAT strategy in
Lebanon. Tob Control 2008;17:324–31.
10. Hay C. Lebanon Meeting. 13 August 1995. British American Tobacco. http://bat.
library.ucsf.edu/data/g/r/b/grb44a99/grb44a99.pdf.
11. Collin J, Lee K, Gilmore A. Unlocking the corporate documents of British American
Tobacco: an invaluable global resource needs radically improved access. Lancet
2004;363:1746–7.
12. Lee K, Gilmore A, Collin J. Looking inside the tobacco industry: revealing insights
from the Guildford depository. Addiction 2004;99:394–7.
13. Forster N. The analysis of company documentation. In: Cassell C, Symon G, eds.
Qualitative methods in organizational research: a practical guide. London, UK: Sage,
1994: 147–66.
14. Shukayr M. [Letter to William R. Dales]. 7 September 1970. Philip Morris. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=uqd54e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
15. Wisner JJ. LEBANON -ADVERTISING RESTRICTION. 18 July 1973. Lorillard. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=mfr90e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
16. Philip Morris. FIVE YEAR PLAN 800000–840000 BOOK IV SMOKING AND HEALTH.
PART 2 OF 2. 1979. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kgr02a00/pdf.
17. Philip Morris. Lebanon Area V, 5-Year Plan.1981. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=fhy19e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
18. Macleod TA. Lebanon - Anti Smoking Legislation. 19 May 1980. Philip Morris.
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=tkf08e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
19. Shukayr M. [Telex from Muhammed Shukayr to TA Macleod]. 17 May 1980. Philip
Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=kkf08e00&fmt=pdf&ref=
results.
20. Anonymous. Medal for Hmade for fighting smoking. Al Nahar 4 June 1994.
21. Loewenberg S. Tobacco Lights into WHO: Industry Pushes to Influence October
Treaty Debate Over Global Curbs on Cigarettes. 2000. British American Tobacco.
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jyx92a99/pdf?search=%22325094285%22.
22. Baroudi B. LEBANON -AD BAN THREAT. Philip Morris. 20 March 2000. Available
from author on request.
23. Middle East Tobacco Association. Draft Minutes 23rd META Meeting Danesfield
House. 28 June 1995. British American Tobacco. http://bat.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
zag60a99.
24. Middle East Tobacco Association. LEBANON ANTI-SMOKING BILL. 23 August
1995. British American Tobacco. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/erb44a99/pdf.
25. Anonymous. Draft Voluntary Marketing Code of Conduct in Lebanon. 17 October
1995. British American Tobacco. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lag60a99/pdf.
26. Middle East Tobacco Association. META - Dubai 25th META Meeting at Paris. 29
January 1996. British American Tobacco. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iag60a99/
pdf.
27. Middle East Tobacco Association. Draft Minutes 25th META Meeting Plaza
Athenee Hotel, Paris. 26 February 1996. British American Tobacco. http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/hag60a99/pdf.
28. Hay C. Mid Year Review. 22 August 1996. British American Tobacco. http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/hdg60a99/pdf.
29. Middle East Tobacco Association. Draft Agenda 28th META Meeting Dubai, UAE.
17 March 1997. British American Tobacco. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
kzf60a99/pdf.
30. Richards JW, Tye JB, Fischer PM. The tobacco industry’s code of advertising in the
United States: myth and reality. Tob Control 1996;5:295–311.
31. Mamudu HM, Hammond R, Glantz SA. Project Cerberus: tobacco industry strategy
to create an alternative to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Am J Pub
Health 2008;98:1630–1642.
32. Anonymous. Council of ministers tomorrow in Saray: illegal shipments and banning
cigarette advertising. Al Nahar 28 October 1998.
33. Anonymous. Advertising dangers of smoking on the cigarette box and while
advertising for it. Al Safir 15 April 1980.
34. Anonymous. Kettaneh F. Ministre de la Sante Publique Mesure Anti-Tabac F.A.
Kettaneh. 16 May 1980. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=
ukf08e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
35. Anonymous. Kettaneh F. Avertissment du Ministere de la Sante-Liban. 10 June
1980. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=tff08e00&fmt=
pdf&ref=results.
36. Macleod TA. Smoking + Health – Lebanon. 17 June 1980. Philip Morris. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=bff08e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
37. Macleod TA. Smoking and Health - Lebanon. 11 June 1980. Philip Morris. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=qff08e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
38. Blausten R. BATCo Press Cuttings Index. 27 February 1984. http://bat.library.ucsf.
edu/data/o/y/h/oyh57a99/oyh57a99.pdf.
39. RJ Reynolds. DRAFT MINUTES OF MIDDLE EAST WORKING GROUP MEETING
GENEVA, THURSDAY APRIL 12, 1984 (840412). 15 May 1984. RJ Reynolds. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=xxq85d00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
40. Fal A. Cigarette Advertisements - Health Warnings. 21 December 1982. British
American Tobacco. Bates no.: 303698720/1. Available from Guildford Depository.
Accessed 15 June 2004.
41. Moore G. Minutes of the Middle East Working Group Meeting Held in Larnaca,
Cyprus, on Wednesday, 9th November, 1983. 11 November 1983. Philip Morris.
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=cqw46e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
42. Cannon M. [Letter from Martin Cannon to Kirkland Blair (Carreras Rothmans)
regarding health warning stock]. 1981. British American Tobacco. Bates no.:
303698964. Available from Guildford Depository. Accessed 20 June 2004.
43. Morini H. Warning Clauses in the Arab World. 16 June 1982. British American
Tobacco. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pss55a99/pdf.
44. British American Tobacco. Smoking and Health: The Public and the Authorities
Strategies and Constraints. November 1978. British American Tobacco.http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/phu10a99/pdf;jsessionid=682A084C69D81DB7E438D38299E75114.
45. Ely R. WARNING LABELS:USA.COMPANY. 20 June 1984. http://legacy.library.ucsf.
edu/tid/wre92a99/pdf.
46. Davies R. Lebanon-Health Warnings. 25 June 1992 British American Tobacco.
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zko27a99/pdf.
47. Wander N, Malone R. Making big tobacco give in: you lose, they win. Am J Pub
Health 2006;96:2048–54.
48. Sheehy P. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation Monthly Management Report.
May 1992. British American Tobacco. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eto20a99/pdf.
49. META. MINUTES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WORKING GROUP MEETING HELD IN
SLOUGH, ENGLAND, ON WEDNESDAY, 840125. 3 February 1984 Philip Morris. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=pej19c00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
50. Assunta M, Chapman S. A mire of highly subjective and ineffective voluntary
guidelines: tobacco industry efforts to thwart tobacco control in Malaysia. Tob Control
2004;13:ii-43–50.
51. Philip Morris. N.Y. PACKAGING MONTHLY STATE REPORT. April 1982. Philip Morris.
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=usq62e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
52. Wollenberg S. Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds Agree to Put Warnings on All Cigarette
Packs. 7 February 1992. Philip Morris. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=
coh19e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
53. Anonymous. The health committee amended regulation of medical profession-
Warning from dangers of smoking to take 20% of the time of visual advertising. Al-
Nahar 14 March 1992.
54. Anonymous. Minister of Health Urges Lebanese to abstain from Smoking on May
31. Al Nahar 27 May 1994.
55. British American Tobacco. Tobacco Strategy Group Major Market Strategies -
Korea. [1944] British American Tobacco. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/riz70a99/
pdf.
56. Anonymous. Hmade calls on advertising to contribute towards campaign to fight
smoking. Al Safir 27 May 1994.
57. Ibrahim A. Lebanon seeks to stub out cigarette ads. Daily Star 6 June 2000.
58. Dinmore S. [World Alert February 3, 2000]. TMA report. 2000. R.J. Reynolds. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=sfk65a00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
59. Bazzi M. Lebanon’s bloody summer. The Nation 10 July 2007.
60. The Republic of Lebanon. Minutes of the Council of Ministers Meeting, 5 August
2004. Beirut, Lebanon: Republic of Lebanon, 2004.
61. Sebrie E, Glantz S. Attempts to undermine tobacco control: tobacco industry ‘‘youth
smoking prevention’’ programs to undermine meaningful tobacco control in Latin
America. Am J Public Health 2007;97:1357–67.
62. Agence France Press. Poisoned by war, Lebanon reaps meagre harvest. http://
www.tobacco.org/articles/country/lebanon/2007 (accessed 1 April 2007).
63. Brown & Williamson. 1989–1993 Corporate Plan.[1988] Brown & Williamson.
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=npl33f00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
Research paper
Tobacco Control 2009;18:310–316. doi:10.1136/tc.2008.029405 315
64. Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Environment. Official website. http://www.moe.
gov.lb/.2009 (accessed 1 April 2007).
65. Lebanon. State of the environment report 2001. http://www.moe.gov.lb/Reports/
SOER2001.htm (accessed 1 April 2007).
66. Siddiqi S, Masud T, Nishtar S, et al. Framework for Assessing Health Governance in
Developing Countries: Gateway to Good Governance. Health System Metrics
Technical Meeting. Glion, Switzerland: 2006. http://www.who.int/healthmetrics/
documents/siddigigoverance.pdf (accessed 5 April 2007).
67. United Nations Development Programme. Governance for sustainable human
development. A UNDP policy document. http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/
(accessed 1 April 2007).
68. World Health Organization. Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on the protection of public health
policies with respect to tobacco control from commercial and other vested interests
of the tobacco industry. http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf
(accessed 1 December 2008).
By Matt Davies.  Tribune Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed with permission.
The lighter side
Research paper
316 Tobacco Control August 2009 Vol 18 No 4
